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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
JENSEN'S USED CARS, Respondent, 
Case 
vs. 
No. 8741 
JAMES T. RICE, Appellant. 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of the 
State of Utah 
HONORABLE RAY VAN COTT, JR., District Judge 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action for a deficiency Judgment brought by 
Jensen's Used Cars against James T. Rice on a Conditional 
Sales Contract for an automobile purchased by the Defendant, 
and an action on a check given to the Plaintiff by the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff, Jensen's Used Cars, is a nonentity under 
which Mr. Thomas Hunsaker does business as a used car dealer. 
On or about August 12, 195 5, Mr. Victor W. Jones brought 
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a 1955 Ford Mainline 6 Sedan to the home of Mr. Rice. 
During the conversation that ensued, the price of the auto-
mobile was discussed, but Mr. Jones apparently did not have 
a full understanding of the terms and conditions of the sale. 
It was finally agreed that the automobile would be left in the 
possession of Mr. Rice, whereupon Mr. Rice delivered a check 
dated August 13, 1957 to Mr. Jones in the amount of $200.00, 
and signed a contract in blank. 
On or about the 17th day of August, 1955, Mr. Rice went 
to the Walker Bank & Trust Company of Murray and signed 
a Conditional Sales Contract and a Promissory Note, Exhibits 
2 and 3. The cash balance was $1850.00 of which $50.00 repre-
sented sales tax and license plates, which were never ob-
tained. The evidence indicates, and this is not controverted 
by Plaintiffs testimony, that Mr. Rice signed this Contract with 
the understanding that the Plaintiff, Mr. Hunsaker, was to 
refund to him the sum of $100.00, and in or~er to protect 
himself and to see that this was done, he stopped payment on 
the $200.00 check which had previously been delivered to 
Mr. Jones. 
The Defendant, James Rice, operated the car for 19 
days until the sticker ran out, and then parked it at his 
home until November 9, 1955, at which time it was 
picked up in front of his home by Mr. A. J. Carter, a repre-
sentative of the Walker Bank & Trust Company in Murray, 
and returned to the Hunsaker automobile lot. Thereafter it 
was sold across the Salt Lake Auto Auction. 
On December 7, 1955, the Plaintiff paid off the contract 
to Walker Bank & Trust Company paying the amount of 
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$1,860.00, and thereafter commenced this action for recovery 
on the deficiency represented by the difference between the 
amount claimed for the car as received from the Salt Lake Auto-
mobile Auction and the amount paid to the bank, and for the 
$200.00 represented by the check which has never cleared the 
Bank. 
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff 
and submitted the question of attorney fees and the matter 
of the $200.00 check to the jury for a decision upon inter-
rogatories. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
Relied on for Reversal 
1. The Court erred in refusing to grant Defendant's Mo-
tion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Complaint failed to 
state a claim against Defendant upon which relief can be 
granted. 
2. The Court erred in having directed a verdict for the 
Plaintiff and against the Defendant upon its own Motion in 
the following particulars: 
(a) That there was sufficient evidence to be presented 
to the jury on the basis of whether a contract was ever executed 
by the Defendant since delivery of the executed contract to 
the Walker Bank & Trust Company as agent for the Plaintiff 
was conditional upon the refund to the Defendant of $100.00 
by the Plaintiff, or installing a radio in the automobile. 
(b) That there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on 
the matter of failure of consideration in as much as the whole 
consideration for the contract was returned to the Plaintiff. 
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(c) That there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury 
on the question of whether a contract had ever in fact been 
executed since there was a dispute in the evidence as to whether 
there had been a meeting of the minds of the parties on the 
amount of the purchase price of the automobile. 
3. The Court erred in failing to allow the Defendant to 
introduce Exhibits 8 and 9. 
4. The Court erred in instructing the jury on the special 
interrogatories in that it failed to set forth the Defendant's 
theory of the case, and further erred in instructing the jury 
after argument of Counsel and allowing the Attorney for the 
Plaintiff to discuss the instructions in front of the jury and 
thereby granting them in effect a contradictory instruction. 
STATEMENT AND ARGUMENT 
The fundamental questions to be determined here as the 
writer sees them are: 
1. Whether the Court on its own Motion should have 
granted a directed verdict in favor of the Plaintiff. 
2. That the Court erred in the other instructions and in 
the manner and time the instructions were given. 
ARGUMENT 
It is our main contention that the Court erred in directing a 
verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and that on the basis of any 
one of three theories there was sufficient evidence to take this 
matter to a jury. 
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The evidence shows that the night the automobile was 
delivered to the Defendant, that a Contract was signed in 
blank; however, this contract was apparently never used, and 
was either destroyed or is still in the files of the Plaintiff. The 
actual contract sued upon was signed by Mr. Rice at the office 
of the Walker Bank & Trust Company in Murray in the pres-
ence of Mr. Frank Nelson. However, even though the contract 
did not state the purchase price as understood by Mr. Rice, 
he signed the document with the reservation that the Plaintiff 
was to refund to him $100.00 or install a 6 tube radio in the 
automobile. That this was Mr. Rice's understanding of the 
contract is clearly indicated throughout the record of his 
testimony. On direct examination he testified as follows: 
(Trans. 68): 
A. nOn the 17th of August. I signed the stop payment 
order on that at the same time Mr. Jones called 
me and told me that he had made arrangements 
at Murray Bank with Frank Nelson to finance this 
car. I immediately called Mr. Nelson for what 
amount he was making this note for and he told 
me and I went right directly to my bank at that 
moment and stopped payment on that check. I 
checked with my bank to be sure." 
Q. ((Yes. On the 17th of August, is that right?" 
A "Y ,, . es. 
Q. And the day after, on the 18th, you went into the 
Murray Bank, the day following you went into the 
bank and signed a contract and by the terms of 
which you agreed to pay $2045.70, is that right?" 
A. ccYes, sir." 
Q. CCDid you tell Mr. Nelson that you had placed a 
stop payment on that check?" 
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A ecy • '' . es, su. 
Q. nYou told him at that time?'' 
A. nYes, sir.· I told Mr. Jones also. I called Mr. Jones 
the same day and told him I had stopped pay-
. ment on his check.'' 
Q. But in any event you agreed to pay $2045.70, didn't 
you?" 
A. "I agreed to do that a dozen times." 
On another occasion, on cross examination, Mr. Rice 
again testified (Trans. 83): 
A. Mr. Jones called me and he said that he had got 
Mr. Frank Nelson to agree to take the contract 
on this Ford and wanted me to call Frank. I called 
Frank and he said that he was making the con-
tract and wanted me to come down and sign it. 
I asked him for what amount. He said it was for 
$1600.00 plus the tax, sales tax, title, and license, 
and I told him then that I had bought an insurance 
policy for it and I would have Valley State Bank 
make him a loss payable clause and send him the 
policy. Well, then in that same conversation Mr. 
Jones told me he was taking it for $1600.00 and 
I told him at that moment and I said, "I am going 
right down and stop payment on my check unless 
you want to meet me at the bank and pay you 
the hundred dollars and take up the check." He 
said, "Well you understand the car is $1800 ?" 
And I said, "I do not. I understand the car is 
$1700.00 unless you put a six. tube radio in it." 
I said, ((The car is $1700.00, exactly the same price 
I had before." He said, ((We've got your check 
and we're going to keep it.'' I went and put a stop 
payment on it. I offered him a hundred dollars 
for it and I offered to release it at the bank for 
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it. In fact, I went in the bank and offered to make 
these payn1ents and leave the money for them." 
It is true that both Mr. Jones and Mr. Hunsaker disagreed 
with Mr. Rice on many of the facts of the case; however, on 
one point, both Mr. Jones and Mr. Hunsaker agree, and that is 
that they never at any time discussed the purchase price of 
the vehicle directly with Mr. Rice. Mr. Jones on cross exami-
nation testified with regard to the purchase price as follows 
(Trans. 34): 
Q. Was there anything said at that time about the 
purchase price of this car would be $1700.00 with-
out a radio or $1800.00 with a radio?" 
A. He had made arrangements with another one of 
Mr. Hunsaker's men about the price and I told 
him I didn't know anything about that. That he 
made the arrangements. All I told him-." 
Q. Well then answer again was there anything said, 
Mr. Jones, by Mr. Rice to you at that time that 
there was an understanding or an agreement that 
the car was to be $1700.00 without radio or 
$1800.00 with a radio?" 
A. No, sir. He did state that he would ask the price 
of a radio and I didn't know, and I told him that 
I would get him one at our cost.'' 
Q. ((And how much did you tell him that you wanted 
of that price before you delivered the car ?" 
A. ((I wanted $500.00 but I said I would settle for 
$200.00." 
Q. ((You wanted $500.00? You were supposed to 
collect the full amount for the car, weren't you?" 
A. ((It was left to my discretion. He told me to bring 
the money back. He had arranged with the bank 
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and I assumed there would be a cashier's check 
waiting for me.'' 
Q. CCDo you know how much the cashier's check 
would be?" 
A CCN . '' . O, Slr. 
Q. t(Did Mr. Hunsaker tell you at any time how much 
you were to bring back?'' 
A "N . ,, . O, Slr. 
Q. ccAll right. When you arrived there at the home of 
Mr. Rice you were to bring back the money but 
you didn't know how much you were to bring 
back, is that right?" 
A. "That's right." 
Q. All right. Now at the time you arrived there, Mr. 
Jones, did you at any time tell Mr. Rice any specific 
amount that he was being charged for this cart 
A UN " . o. 
The Plaintiff, Mr. Hunsaker, testified regarding personal 
arrangements with Mr. Rice as follows (Trans. 109): 
Q. "Yes. Mr. Hunsaker, did you personally make this 
arrangement with Mr. Rice?'' 
A. "Not personally, but I told the fellows that were 
helping me what the deal was." 
And on cross examination he testified (Trans. 110): 
By MR. BARCLAY: 
Q. "Mr. Hunsaker, did you ever at any time tell Mr. 
Rice that the price was $1850.00 ?" 
A UN , . o. 
10 
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Q. {(Did you ever have any conversation with him at 
all?" 
A. No. Not before that. He had taken delivery." 
Q. CCAnd did you ever have any conversation with Mr. 
Rice at all about purchasing this Ford Mainline?'' 
A. ccNot until after it was purchased." 
The record is quite confused on many points, but on the 
point that there was never any meeting of the minds with 
regard to the exact amount of the purchase price there can 
be no doubt. On this basis, the Court should have allowed 
the matter to be taken to the jury in accordance with the issues 
framed in the Answer of the Defendant to the Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
The Answer sets forth a denial that the Contract was 
executed, except in blank; however, the facts clearly show that 
the Contract in question was executed at the Walker Bank 
& Trust Co. But, the Answer does go on to set forth the 
claim that the purchase price was to be $1700.00 without a 
radio or $1800.00 with a radio, and by reason of this mis-
understanding, there was an issue as to whether there was 
ever a Contract executed. In addition, the Answer goes on 
to set forth that there was a failure of consideration by reason 
of the Plaintiff's taking the automobile back, and this was a 
proper issue for the jury to decide: Whether in the first place 
there was a Contract, and whether there was a failure of this 
Contract by reason of failure of consideration. The Defendant 
in his Answer then goes on to set forth that by reason of the 
foregoing facts, Defendant is entitled to cancellation of any 
and all indebtedness which Plaintiff alleges to be due it from 
11 
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Defendant, and that Defendant is entitled to cancellation of 
such notes acknowledged by Plaintiff to be in existence since 
the consideration for such instrument wholly failed and was 
returned to Plaintiff. 
It is also clear from the evidence that when Mr. Rice 
signed a contract at the Bank, this executed Contract was 
delivered to Mr. Frank Nelson conditionally upon Mr. Rice 
being refunded $100.00 out of the $200.00 check on which 
he had stopped payment or in the alternative that a six tube 
radio was to be installed in the vehicle. Neither of these things 
was done. 
The general principle of law is stated in 3 American Juris-
prudence, 439, paragraph 886: 
c CWhere the trial Court directs or refuses to direct 
a verdict in favor of the Defendant (Plaintiff in this 
case) the question of law before the reviewing Court is 
not as to the weight of the evidence, but whether there 
was any evidence which would have warranted a verdict 
in favor of the Plaintiff (in this case the Defendant) 
... For the purpose of determining the correctness of 
the trial court's ruling, the Appellate Court will con-
sider the evdence in its most favorable aspect for the 
opposing party. The evidence of the one against whom 
the verdict is directed in the trial court must be ac-
cepted as true." 
In the case of Boskovitch vs. Utah Construction Company, 
259 Pac. (2d) 885, at page 886, the Court has set out the basis 
on which a trial Judge shoudl grant a directed verdict: 
t c In deciding a. motion for a directed verdict, the 
Court must consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the Motion is 
12 
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directed and must resolve every controverted fact in 
his favor. (Cites cases.) The inquiry, then, must be 
directed toward whether reasonable minds could dis-
agree in this case on the evidence presented so as to 
provide a question for the jury.'' 
The Court in directing this verdict took the attitude that 
the only questions presented by the Answer of the Defendant 
was whether the Plaintiff had ever agreed to a cancellation of 
the Contract. There was no evidence on this point, but the 
Court failed to give consideration to the other defenses set 
out in Defendant's Answer, so that the Defendant might be 
entitled to a cancellation by reason of the premises stated 
above. The Court at one point questions counsel for the de-
fense on this matter, and asks the question (Trans. 104): 
Court ... HAs I say to the price of the car, you have 
never raised an issue against that so I presume that 
that is satisfactory to you. Isn't that right?" 
A. c CThat' s right.'' 
We submit that the way the question was put, that counsel 
for the defense misunder~tood the question directly, and that 
the issue was before the Court was clearly stated in the Answer, 
and should have been presented to the jury. To substantiate this 
further, we call to your attention that later on the counsel 
for the defense clearly sets forth his contention in a further 
conversation between him and the Court (Trans. 103) : 
THE COURT: "Well, of course, now there is no 
pleading of thought here. Nobody pleads thought. You 
don't plead it, do you, Mr. Barclay?" 
A. CCI don't plead thought, no." 
13 
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THE COURT: ((You just claim that there is a differ-
ent contract for $1700.00, that is what you allege?" 
A. ((A different understanding, yes." 
THE COURT: ((Well the fact of the matter is this 
is the one that was signed on the 12th which I have 
admitted is the one he says was destroyed, isn't it?" 
A ((y '' . es. 
Even the Defendant understood the theory of his case 
as indicated by the answers given to Inetrrogatories from the 
Court and Attorney for the Plaintiff (Trans. 100): 
THE COURT: ((You just answer his question. That 
is the trouble. There has been too much talk here." 
Q. ((Has anyone-well now, I'll make it more specific-
has Mr. Hunsaker or Mr. Jones or Mr. Nelson, or 
any officer or agent of the bank ever cancelled this 
note and contract, or agreed to cancel it with you?" 
A. ttW ell, I stated before that I went into the bank 
and offered to make these payments-
THE COURT: ((No. Just answer the question. Don't 
tell us about your virtues.'' 
Q. ((Has anyone ever told you that you wouldn't have 
to pay those?" 
A HN " . 0. 
Q. ((No one has ever told you that they would cancel 
them and you wouldn't have to pay that note and 
contract, have they? Answer the question." 
A. ((My note and contract was with Walker Bank." 
Q. ((Was what?" 
A. ((Was with Walker Bank and when I went in to 
agree to make the payments on the note and the 
14 
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contract it was with an understanding that the 
car came to me at the price represented in the 
original deal.'' 
Q. ccWell, did anybody ever tell you that they would 
cancel that note and contract that you didn't have 
to pay it? Now you can answer that yes or no." 
THE COURT: "Mr. Rice, let me just read your 
answer that you filed in this case. "Defendant further 
alleges that the only instrument he at any time executed 
and delivered to plaintiff was delivered by him to one 
Oliver executed in blank by defendant with the under-
standing that such instrument would be filled in for 
the sum of $1700.00 as the purchase price for an auto-
mobile without aradio and for the sum of $1800.00 
as the purchase price of said automobile with the 
radio." Now that is what you allege as your defense .. , 
A ccy • '' . es, str. 
Q. ccThen you allege that that deal that you made, that 
I have just read, was canceled by these people when 
they took the car back. Now that is your pleadings 
that your attorney has filed here. Now let's find out 
about that. Is that correct?'' 
A. ccw ell, your Honor, it is gross misrepresentation, 
if you want to be frank about it, from the very be-
. . ,, gmntng. 
THE COURT: ccWell, now let's get down to this. 
Is it correct that you signed a note and a contract in 
bank with the understanding that it woud be $1700 ?" 
A ccy • '' . es, str. 
THE COURT: ctWithout a radio and $1800.00 if it 
did have a radio?" 
A "Y . ,, . es, str. 
THE COURT: eels that correct?" 
A ccy • '' . es, str. 
15 
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3. The Court. erred in refusing to allow Exhibits 8 and 9 
to be introduced into evidence. In the first place, when these 
exhibits were first offered, the Court refused to accept them 
on the basis that they were self serving. They were next used 
by counsel for the Plaintiff in his ~irect examination of Mr. 
Hunsaker (Trans. 110), and in spite. of the fact that the Court 
indicated that they had not been accepted in evidence, counsel 
for the Plaintiff used Exhibit 8 in his examination of his wit-
ness. This was immediately called to the attention of the Court, 
but the Court still refused to allow the document in evidence. 
In spite of the fact that the letter was not offered in evidence, 
the record indicates at page 91 that it was an offer on the 
part of Mr. Rice to pay $100.00. This letter should have been 
admitted on the basis that there was a conflict as to the actual 
terms of the written agreement and this served to substan-
tiate the position of Mr. Rice in the matter. 
4. The Court upon the stipulation of counsel gave oral 
instructions which are unnumbered -except for the first. The 
instructions as given prior to the argument of counsel are 
improper in that the Court failed to cover the theories of both 
parties in his instructions. In the case of Startin vs. Madsen, 
23 7 Pac. ( 2d) 834, at page 836, this Court made the following 
statement: 
celt was the duty of the Court to cover the theories of 
both parties in his instructions. (Citing cases.) If the 
instructions ·are considered as a whole, as they must 
be, (Citing cases) the Court adequately discharged his 
duty and fairly presented the issues to the jury." 
In this particular case, after all of the instructions were 
given, the ~ourt then stated (Trans. 121): 
16 
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c~Now the findings that I ·uv-ill : · ..·.binit to you and that 
will be in writing will be ~-.s follows: 
That will be in a form of a -~_:.estion .. Is the amount 
of the $200.00 check to be deducted from the balance 
of the Exhibits 3 and 2? .'1_nswer yes or no, depending 
upon your b.ndings or dc.t:_L)erations. Sign blank line, 
foreman." 
The question as submitted ·'was pxuper, except that in no 
place in the instructions -does the Court attempt to explain 
to the jury the theory of the Pla::-.:tiif s ( r~se as explained above. 
After the Attorneys argued their respective cases, the Court 
then undertook to instruct the jury further, which is in specifiic 
violation of Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
states in the last paragraph: 
"Arguments for the respective parties shall be made 
after the Court bas instructed the jury." 
At page 121 and 122 of the record, the Court made the 
following instruction after the Attorneys argued their cases: 
THE COURT: 4 ~There is one other matter with re-
gard to these other matters that have been here before 
submitted and have been set forth in these pleadings 
that I have indicated to you. By v i;tue of the evidence 
that has been produced here I v1ill conclude as a matter 
of law, and the finding will be made by me as a matter 
of law, or other subjects relative to this -matter. There 
is no disputable question for you to determine other 
than these that I have submitted to you.H 
C(Ladies and Gentlemen, I ar.o going to have the Clerk 
prepare a directed verdict, which I will require, and 
direct the foreman of the ; ury to sign for the amount 
prayed for by this plaintiff, adding to or deducting this 
$200.00 that I have mentioned to you, depending upon 
17 
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what your finding is and this verdict that I will also 
hand ~o you wiH. be with or without attorney's fees, 
depending upon what your findings are on that verdict 
that: I_ will submit to :you fqr your deliberations at the 
eQ.d ·of this case." :. 
It is to be -noted that this inst~uctio~ . relative to the form 
of the questoin to be · submitted is cha~ged from t~e form 
~ . : . .t~ 
quoted above. This_ undoubtedly contfibuted to the confusion 
of the jury; but ~ev-en more confusing'" there ensued a discussion 
by Counsel for_· the Plaintiff and the Court as to whether the 
instruction secondly given was proper. The jury was dismissed 
without the point being resolved and the effect was contradictory 
instructions being given to the jury. After the jury retired to 
deliberate upon the verdict, the Court then asked the parties 
to stipulate _with regard to the correc! i~sue in reference to the 
check. However, at this point the damage was done and it was 
too late to correct it by stipulation of _Cou~sel. The proper issues 
were never presented to the jury fq! their consideration. 
It can be. argued that in as much -as the Defendant failed 
to object or take exception to the instructions before they were 
submitted to the jury, he waived his rights to do so thereafter. 
Utah Rules· of Civil Procedure, Rule 51, does not specifical-
ly refer to Interrogatories subrn_itted to the jury. However, 
this Court in. the case of Coqper vs. Evans, et al. ( 262 Pac. 
(2d) 278), 1 Utah (2d) 68, at page 70, made the following 
statement: 
nThe Rule 51 does not expressly refer to special in-
terrogatories but generally speaking, the same prin-
ciple is undoubtedly sound as applied to them also." 
fs 
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The Court then goes ay to point out that in that particular 
case counsel were given no opportunity to object to such interro-
gatories, and we feel that the same argument applies in this 
case. The writer was ~ot the Attorney who tried this case in 
the District Court; how~ver, it appears upon reading the record 
that at no time were the Attorneys .given an opportunity to 
object or take exceptioo to the .interrogatories, or to the in-
structions, and therefore, we believe that it cannot be said that 
the Defendant has waived his right to object to the interro-
gatories or to the instructions given. At pag~ 123 the Court 
stops the discussion, so that the jury could be sent out. 
It would appear that the Court in making additional in-
structions after the argument ot counsel and by allowing 
counsel for the Plaintiff to discuss the instractions, that the 
jury was plainly impressed that the only answer that could 
be given to the interrogatories finally submitted was yes. The 
whole procedure was completely <:ontrary to the requirements 
of Rule 51, U.R.C.P. 
5. Finally, we wish to call to your attention the dis-
crepancies in the evidence with regard to the te$mony con-
cerning the sum of money received for the automobile when 
it was sold across the Salt Lake City Auction. In the first place, 
in the answers to the Interrogatories, Answer No. 12, the 
sum given was $1,080.00. Secondly, Mr. Vic Jones, who ap-
parently was the person who 'handled the sale at the .Salt Lake 
City Auction, testified that the amount received was $1,170.00, 
and finally Mr. Thomas Hunsaker, the Plaintiff, testified that 
the sum of $1,070.00 was recovered. From the verdict given, 
it is obvious that the figures testified to by Mr. Hunsaker were 
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used, although the matter is .not called to the attention of 
the jury, except that the Court in its first instruction refers to 
the Plaintiff's Complaint, and uses the figures of Plaintiff. It 
would seem.that thereby the Court instructed the jury to accept 
this figure and disrega~d the testimony and this matter was 
taken from the hands of the jury. The jury should have been 
left to determine which of the statements it would believe, 
but it had no opportunity ,to ~o so. 
WHEREFORE, the Def~ndant. prays that the said Judgment 
in said entitled cause be reversed and. that the Defendant have 
its costs herein incurred or in the alternative that the case be 
remanded to the District Court for a new trial. 
Defendant prays for such other and further relief as may 
be meet in the premises. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOWRY, KIRTON & BETTILYON 
VERDEN E. BETTILYON 
Counsel for Appellant 
519 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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